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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Ryan Lee Johnson appeals from his conviction and sentence for domestic 
battery with traumatic injury in the presence of a child. Specifically, Johnson 
challenges the denial of his requested unanimity instruction and he asserts the 
district court abused its sentencing discretion. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The state charged Johnson with two separate counts of domestic battery 
with traumatic injury in the presence of a child and one count of attempted 
strangulation for instances occurring with his ex-wife and the mother of his two 
children, Melissa Johnson. (R., pp.27-28.) Before trial, Johnson requested a 
unanimity instruction for Count I, the domestic battery with traumatic injury in the 
presence of a child occurring on October 5, 2011. The information as it regards 
Count I reads as follows: 
That the Defendant, RYAN LEE JOHNSON, on or about the 
5th day of October, 2011, in the County of Ada, State of Idaho, did 
willfully and unlawfully use force or violence upon the person of 
Melissa Johnson by restraining her, throwing her down, slapping 
her in the face, hitting her on the head, and/or by throwing her into 
a bathtub, while in the presence of C.J. (D.O.B. , and 
by committing said battery did inflict a traumatic injury upon the 
person of Melissa Johnson, to-wit: bruising to her arms and/or 
chest and/or a sprain to her right thumb, where Melissa Johnson 
and the Defendant are household members. 
(R., p.28.) Johnson requested a unanimity instruction based upon his contention 
that the information "allege[d] several different acts and each one could 
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constitute a separate crime." (2/09/12 Tr., p.4, Ls.18-20.) The trial court denied 
the request, holding: 
They are separate acts. But when you have a series of - especially 
in a domestic battery where the allegations are a beating that 
occurs over a period from one room to the other, to require the 
state to prove that the beating - the hitting that occurred in the 
bathroom is the one that caused the traumatic injury or the hitting 
that occurred in the living room is what caused the traumatic injury 
is simply not what the law requires. So I'm denying the request. 
(2/09/12 Tr., p13, L.17-p.14, L.1.) 
The case proceeded to trial with Johnson, the victim, and their child in 
common all testifying as to their individual recollection of the events at issue. 
(See generally 2/13/12 Tr., pp.251-265 (testimony of Melissa); 2/14/12 Tr., p.406, 
L.16 - p.423, L.21 (Johnson's testimony), p.482, L20 - p.496, L.1 (C.J.'s 
testimony).) The jury returned a verdict of guilty to Count I, not guilty on Count II 
(attempted strangulation), and guilty on a lesser included charge of domestic 
battery on Count Ill. (R., pp.12-14.) 
The court sentenced Johnson to three years fixed followed by 12 years 
indeterminate on Count I and a concurrent six-month jail sentence on Count Ill. 




Johnson states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the district court err in denying Mr. Johnson's request for 
a unanimity instruction? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion by imposing an 
excessive sentence in light of the mitigating factors that exist in this 
case? ' 
(Appellant's brief, p. 9.) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
1. Has Johnson failed to show that the district court erred when it did not give 
a unanimity instruction on Count I? 





Johnson Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred When It Did Not Give 
A Unanimity Instruction On Count I 
A Introduction 
Johnson asserts that the district court erred when it did not give a 
unanimity instruction on Count I, domestic battery with traumatic injury occurring 
in the presence of a child, occurring on October 5, 2011. (Appellant's brief, pp. 
15-17.) His assertion, however, is baseless because Johnson cannot show from 
the record that the state presented evidence of multiple separate and distinct 
acts that could have, by themselves, been the basis of conviction instead of the 
one criminal count charged by the state. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Whether a jury was properly instructed is a question of law over which the 
appellate court exercises free review. Miller v. State, 135 Idaho 261, 265, 16 
P.3d 937, 941 (Ct. App. 2000). To be reversible error, any error in the jury 
instructions must have misled the jury or prejudiced the complaining party. State 
v. Row, 131 Idaho 303, 310, 955 P.2d 1082, 1089 (1998). 
C. Johnson Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred When It Did 
Not Give An Unanimity Instruction 
In Idaho, a criminal defendant may be convicted only when a unanimous 
jury concludes that the criminal act charged has been proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Idaho Const., art. I, § 7. Ordinarily, an instruction informing 
the jury that its "verdict must be unanimous" will suffice to protect the defendant's 
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right to jury unanimity. State v. Nunez, 133 Idaho 13, 19, 981 P.2d 738, 744 
(1999). It is only when the state presents evidence of multiple separate and 
distinct acts, any of which could by themselves form the basis of the count 
charged, that "jury unanimity must be protected by prosecutorial election of a 
single act upon which it will rely for conviction or by a clarifying instruction 
requiring the jurors to agree that the same underlying criminal act has been 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt." Miller v. State, 135 Idaho 261, 268, 16 P.3d 
937, 944 (Ct. App. 2000) (citing State v. Petrich, 683 P.2d 173, 178 (Wash. 
1984)); see also State v. Montoya, 140 Idaho 160, 167-68, 90 P.3d 910, 917-18 
(Ct. App. 2004). 
As the district court addressed when denying the request for the unanimity 
instruction, this was "a beating that occur[ed] over a period from one room to the 
other." (2/09/12 Tr., p.13, Ls.19-20.) Melissa testified an argument over her 
son's cell phone escalated into physical contact, with Johnson coming into 
Melissa's bedroom, yelling at her, then following her into her bathroom where he 
pushed her into the bathtub and threw her around. (2/13/12 Tr., p.252, L.9 -
p.255, L.9.) Johnson stopped beating Melissa and went to the dining room, only 
to come back to her bedroom where Johnson pushed Melissa down and forcibly 
pinned her arms behind her head. (2/13/12 Tr., p.255, L.10 - p.257, L.7.) 
Melissa was able to get loose and "grabbed him in his private area." (2/13/12 Tr., 
p.257, Ls.9-10.) Johnson then slapped Melissa in the face and left her bedroom, 
taking Melissa's phone, and went into the living room. (2/13/12 Tr., p.258, L.12-
p.259, L.19.) Melissa followed Johnson into the living room to get her phone 
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back from him and Johnson pushed Melissa to the floor on her stomach while 
holding her hands behind her back. (2/13/12 Tr., p.258, L.20 - p.260, L.8.) 
This description of events is contrary to Johnson's claim on appeal that 
"each of these events was divided by discernible intervening time periods." 
(Appellant's brief, p.14.) The evidence instead showed one ongoing beating 
where Melissa and Johnson were going from room to room, with one following 
the other without any discernible intervening time periods. Johnson's testimony 
at trial was consistent with this being an ongoing altercation. Although he 
testified his actions were in self-defense, his own testimony of moving throughout 
the house did not include intervening time periods. Johnson testified that, 
following the verbal and physical exchange in the bathroom, Johnson testified he 
was "about halfway through the dining room and Melissa was coming at [him] 
from behind telling [him] that [he] needed to give her this phone back." (2/14/12 
Tr., p.412, Ls.13-16.) Johnson testified about a physical interaction with Melissa 
as the aggressor then taking place in the dining room, upon the conclusion of 
which he went into the living room and sat on the couch. (2/14/12 Tr., p.412, 
L.23 - p.415, L.4.) Melissa then came into the living room where Johnson and 
their child, C.J., were seated on the couch and another physical interaction 
occurred between him and Melissa after which Melissa and C.J. left the home. 
(2/14/12 Tr., p.415, L.2 - p.423, L.21.) Although Johnson's testimony 
characterized Melissa as the aggressor and he as the victim, his version of when 
and where the altercation took place was consistent with Melissa's. 
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C.J. also testified that he was sitting on the couch in the living room while 
his mom and dad were fighting in his mom's bedroom, kitchen and then the living 
room. (2/14/12 Tr., p.484, L.15 - p.490, L.2.) The record belies Johnson's claim 
that the domestic battery as charged in Count I included "separate, distinct, 
alleged batteries, with discernible time periods in between." (Appellant's brief, 
p.16.) Instead, the evidence shows this was an ongoing altercation where 
Johnson and Melissa followed one another throughout the house, room to room, 
with no discernible breaks in the altercation. This was a fight over a cell phone 
that continued throughout the house until Melissa and C.J. left. 
Because the trial testimony makes it clear that the beating Melissa 
suffered at the hands of Johnson was in fact all part of a continuing course of 
conduct with no discernible intervening time periods breaking up the acts of 
violence, Johnson has failed to establish error based on the lack of a unanimity 
instruction and his assertion of error must fail. 
Even assuming that the incidents of physical contact testified to by 
Johnson, Melissa and C.J. constituted separate and distinct acts warranting a 
special unanimity instruction, the lack of such an instruction was harmless and 
does not necessitate reversal of Johnson's conviction. Montoya, 140 Idaho at 
168, 90 P.3d at 918 (applying harmless error analysis where trial court failed to 
give unanimity instruction); Miller, 135 Idaho at 268-69, 16 P.3d at 944-45 
(same). 
In Miller, the Idaho Court of Appeals recognized that even if a district court 
errs by not giving a special unanimity instruction, such error will be deemed 
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harmless so long as the reviewing court is able to declare, beyond a reasonable 
doubt, that the jury would have reached the same result even if the instruction 
had been given. Miller, 135 Idaho at 268-69, 16 P.3d at 944-45. Miller was 
charged with two counts of lewd conduct with a minor under sixteen. At trial, the 
victim testified as to six separate instances of sexual misconduct, any of which 
could have formed the basis for conviction under the charged counts. Although 
the court of appeals agreed with Miller that, under such circumstances, the 
district court was required to have sua sponte given a unanimity instruction, it 
ultimately found the trial error to be harmless. In reaching its determination, the 
court noted that the case turned upon the victim's testimony, which, the court 
noted, the "jury obviously found ... credible, as Miller was found guilty on both 
counts of the indictment." il!:. at 268, 16 P.3d at 944. 
Applying the reasoning of Miller to the facts of this case, it is clear that any 
error in lack of a special unanimity instruction was harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt. As discussed above, Johnson testified fairly consistently with Melissa in 
terms of acts of violence in different parts of the house. Although he admitted the 
acts occurred, he claimed his actions were in self-defense. Thus, as in Miller, the 
only issue the jury had to decide was who was more credible, Melissa or 
Johnson. As in Miller, the jury obviously found Melissa's testimony more 
credible, as it found Johnson guilty of this offense as well as the lesser included 
offense in County Ill. Under the circumstances of this case, there is no rational 
basis by which the jury could have found that Johnson was the aggressor as to 
some of the acts of physical violence but not as to others. Having rejected 
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Johnson's self-defense claim, it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury 
would have reached the same result even had a unanimity instruction been 
given. Thus, as in Miller, the lack of a unanimity instruction is harmless because 
it is clear, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the jury would have convicted 
Johnson even had such an instruction been given. Johnson has failed to show 
any basis for reversal of his conviction. 
11. 
Johnson Has Failed To Establish An Abuse Of The Sentencing Court's 
Discretion 
A. Introduction 
Johnson concedes that "his sentence is within the statutory maximum" 
(Appellant's brief, p.18, n.7), but argues the district court "abused its discretion by 
failing to use due caution in concluding that Mr. Johnson attempted to strangle 
Ms. Johnson [where he was acquitted of attempted strangulation], and by failing 
to adequately consider the mitigating factors that exist in this case." (Appellant's 
brief, p.18.) Johnson has failed to meet his burden and has thereby failed to 
establish that the district court abused its discretion in imposing a 15-year unified 
sentence with the first three years fixed upon a jury finding of guilt to domestic 
battery with traumatic injury in the presence of a child. 
B. Standard Of Review 
When a defendant alleges an excessive sentence on appeal, the appellate 
court independently reviews "all of the facts and circumstances of the case" and 
considers the nature of the offense and the character of the offender. State v. 
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Cope, 142 Idaho 492, 500, 129 P.3d 1241, 1249 (2006). To prevail, the 
appellant must establish that, under any reasonable view of the facts, the 
sentence is excessive considering the objectives of criminal punishment. Cope, 
142 Idaho at 500, 129 P.3d at 1249. Those objectives are "(1) protection of 
society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) the 
possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for wrongdoing." 
State v. Stover, 140 Idaho 927, 933, 104 P.3d 969, 975 (2005). The fixed portion 
of the sentence is considered the probable duration of confinement. State v. 
Sanchez, 115 Idaho 776,777,769 P.2d 1148, 1149 (Ct. App. 1989). A sentence 
that does not exceed the statutory maximum will not be disturbed on appeal 
absent a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771, 772, 653 
P .2d 1183, 1184 (Ct. App. 1982). Where reasonable minds might differ as to the 
length of sentence, the appellate court will not substitute its view for that of the 
sentencing court. State v. Brown, 121 Idaho 385, 393, 825 P.2d 482, 490 
(1992). 
C. Johnson Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its 
Discretion 
Johnson asserts his sentence was excessive when viewed in light of all of 
the circumstances. (Appellant's brief, p.18.) Johnson contends on appeal that 
the sentencing court improperly focused on the unproven allegation of attempted 
strangulation in imposing Johnson's sentence. (Appellant's brief, pp.21-22.) The 
court discussed the "problems" juries seem to have with the elements of 
attempted strangulation (4/14/12 Tr., p.527, L.13 - p.529, L.7), but contrary to 
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Johnson's claim, it did not focus on the "attempted strangulation allegation and 
prior uncharged and unproven allegations of strangulation" (Appellant's brief, 
p.21) in imposing sentence. Although concerned about the information 
presented at sentencing of a prior uncharged victim who suffered "remarkably 
similar" violence at Johnson's hands, the court considered both the evidence of 
mitigation presented by Johnson as well as the aggravating circumstances in 
determining it was time for Johnson to "take responsibility for [his] own actions." 
(4/14/12 Tr., p.528, Ls.3-17.) 
Johnson asked the court at sentencing to retain jurisdiction in his case 
because he "accept[ed] responsibility for the role he played in the confrontation 
and [he exhibited a] willingness to participate in treatment." (Appellant's brief, 
pp.19-20 (citations omitted).) On appeal Johnson cites to the "appalling horror" 
of violence he observed as a child, the time he spent in foster care, and his drug 
and alcohol addictions as part of the mitigation the court should have considered 
in sentencing. (Appellant's brief, pp.20-21.) 
The district court addressed the mitigation presented on Johnson's behalf: 
The other thing I want to say is that you - there's an -
there's an argument that you love your children. Well, here -
here's my suggestion to you. If you love your children, then you 
would not batter the mother of those children especially in front of 
them. 
Now, there was some suggestion in your statement to the 
court that the reason that you have this affinity for assaulting your 
intimate partners is because of what happened to you as a child. 
The fact of the matter is the data do not support that. People who 
observe domestic violence are just as likely to avoid domestic 
violence as they are to commit it. So the data do not support the 
concept that because you saw it as a child you are now a batterer. 
That's a misconception in our society. 
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(4/14/12 Tr., p.530, l.24- p.531, L.15.) The court was concerned with the impact 
of Johnson's behavior on his own children: 
But the one thing that we do know is we have found that 
there are differences in brain activity for children who have 
observed this kind of behavior on the part of their parents. It affects 
children very distinctly. So your children have been affected by 
this. 
(4/14/12 Tr., p.531, Ls.16-21.) 
The court took note of Johnson's failure to take advantage of prior 
opportunities to rehabilitate, including drug court: 
In addition I will point out that you have had significant 
resources, as the prosecutor pointed out; drug court twice; you had 
a retained jurisdiction. And given what I see here, I do not think 
another retained jurisdiction is appropriate. 
(4/14/12 Tr., p.531, L.22 - p.532, l.2.) The court was also concerned with 
Johnson's continued claims of self-defense and his ongoing claim that part of his 
violence against Melissa "was righteous" (Tr., p.529, Ls.13-24) and concluded 
that Johnson was "in need of correctional treatment, and that a lesser sentence 
would depreciate the seriousness of this crime" (Tr., p.530, Ls.9-11). 
Johnson has failed to show that the sentence of three years fixed followed 
by 12 years indeterminate is excessive considering the seriousness of his 
offense and the impact upon his victims when viewed with Johnson's many 
previous failed attempts at treatment and rehabilitation and his continued failure 
to take complete responsibility for his actions. 
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CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to uphold Johnson's judgment of 
conviction and sentence. 
Dated this 29th day of Janua 
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